Abstract: Differentiation represents a structural feature not only of the European integration, where it has a limited application, but also and particularly of the regional organizations established outside Europe, where variable geometry is often a typical element of interstate cooperation. Indeed most of such organizations, operating in developing countries, are based on this principle. In practice the variable geometry translates into the fact that each act, produced within the institutional structure in order to pursue the organization's aims, is submitted for consideration to the member states, who are free to accept it and then to incorporate it into the national legal system with a further approval given in accordance with domestic law. This approach implies that all the member states are bound only by provisions originally set out in the basic treaty, while the secondary law adopted to implement statutory rules concerning both substantive and institutional matters bind only the willing states which have given their consent. So, even if the variable geometry is formally intended as a principle of flexibility allowing for progression in cooperation among a sub-group of members, in practice its application can lead to the fragmentation of the integration process by instituting differences and preventing a real in-depth interstate cooperation.
INTRODUCTION
As known, according to international law scholars international organizations can be classified in intergovernmental organizations and supranational organizations on the basis of the dialectical relationship between state sovereignty, on the one hand, and functions conferred by member states to the organization, on the other hand. 1 However, particularly in the areas of developing countries, the phenomenon of international organization is often fulfilled by the features of soft organizations which differ from hard organizations for the non-binding legal nature of their statutory act. 2 In some cases, the model of soft organizations represents the prodromic phase of interstate cooperation then evolving into an institutionalized organization by signing an international agreement. the ASEAN represents a relevant example as it operated successfully as soft organization for about 40 years and then it was institutionalized by the ASEAN Charter in 2007. 4 Notwithstanding their different legal nature and structural features, both soft organizations and hard organizations are characterized by the objective and steady exercise of common international functions in order to realize the goals that member states have agreed upon in the statutory act. For this purpose, each form of association may avail itself of different normative instruments which can differ from an organization to another depending on its legal nature.
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They can be: 1) non-binding acts which may have different denominations and a diversified substantive content (declaration, recommendation, statement, action plan, etc.); 2) conventional acts (generally known as protocols, treaties, conventions, etc.) concluded by the member states within the organization, being suggested and/or prepared by its organs and subject to the rules of international law from the formal point of view; 6 3) binding organic acts adopted by the institutions of the organization and attributable to it, which form the real secondary law of the organization itself. As these are the normative instruments through which the organization pursues the common goals defined by its members in the statutory act, one could suppose, particularly from the Eurocentric perspective, that they are addressed to all members, thus determining an uniform and common development of the interstate cooperation.
However a general look at the phenomenon of international organizations, particularly at regional and sub-regional level in developing areas, Sometimes the normative instruments through which the organization can pursue its statutory goals are expressly indicated by the founding act. More often this does not provide for them; in these cases, against such statutory silence, member states develop autonomous practice. About this issue, see P. Pennetta, "Organizzazioni internazionali regionali", Enciclopedia del Diritto, Annali IV (2011) 844-908, at 879-886. 6 It is worth noting that conventional acts can be adopted to: 1) regulate institutional aspects of the cooperation; 2) regulate substantive aspects of interstate cooperation; 3) establish new agencies or organizations endowed with sectorial competences, which are subsidiary and instrumental to the main organization. In particular, regarding conventional acts regulating substantive matters, as they are adopted to implement statutory rules, they can be considered as the secondary law of the organization. However, from the formal point of view, such acts follow the rules of public international law as the primary law of the organization. For this reason they can be regarded as an intermediate category between the primary law and the secondary. In this sense see, S. Deluca, "El Mercosur necesita su Maastricht", Revista Pensar en Derecho (2012) 247-265. 7 Literature on regionalism is extremely heterogeneous, depending on the perspective from which it is investigatednot only legal but also economic, historical, etc. Currently most of studies on such topic are from a political science perspective; see among others F. H. (Pedone, Paris, 2012) . Lastly, from a critical legal perspective see, P. Pennetta, "International Regional Organizations: Problems and Issues", in R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds.), supra n. 2, forthcoming. 8 Variable geometry is the term used to describe a method of differentiated integration, whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of member states able and willing to advance, it being implied that the others will follow later. out in the founding act, while rules and acts adopted to implement statutory provisions bind only the willing states which have given their consent and then have ratified or incorporated them. 9 This paper aims at exploring the main features of the principle of variable geometry and how it operates in regional organizations, trying to explain the main reasons for its wide application and to think hard about its consequences. The analysis will be limited to the regional and sub-regional organizations established in developing areas 10 where the phenomenon of international organization is particularly widespread. However, for the purpose of this investigation, only those organizations which have a relevant binding normative production will be taken into account, as just in relation to it the application of variable geometry assumes importance. On the contrary, this paper will not focus on those forms of association which are not operative or adopt only declarations, recommendations or statements because the inner flexibility of such acts -deriving from their non-binding naturemakes it less relevant the eventual application of the variable geometry approach. Finally, this investigation will be based on the classical distinction between intergovernmental organizations and supranational organizations and, in the light of the above said, it will take into account also the practice of soft organizations operating in developing countries, in order to make it easier to catch possible connections between the legal nature of the regional organization and the application of variable geometry.
THE PRINCIPLE OF VARIABLE GEOMETRY: SOME EARLY CONSIDERATIONS Variable geometry is regarded as a form of differentiated cooperation. It operates when a binding (conventional or organic) act, produced within the institutional structure of an organization to pursue its aims, is submitted for consideration to member states, which are free to accept it and then to incorporate it into their national law systems with a further approval given in accordance with their domestic law. In concrete terms, each member state may express its lack of interest in the approval of each (conventional or organic) act and in the meantime its decision not to take part in the decisionmaking procedure does not prevent its adoption by the other members. So each state is free to choose which acts to be bound by, expressing its consent. Hence, all member states are bound only by provisions originally set out in the founding act, while rules and acts adopted within the organization to implement statutory provisions bind only the willing members which have given their consent and have then ratified or incorporated them.
Firstly, the variable geometry may operate in the early phase of the decision-making procedure, when a state expresses its unwillingness to take part in the formation of a binding (conventional or 9 The application of variable geometry in regional organizations outside Europe has been widely overlooked by international law scholars who usually focus on differentiated integration in the EU. About the variable geometry in African regional organizations, see J. T. Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes, Working Papers Series No. 20 of 2009 . Regarding the Central American experience, see V. H. Blanco Fonseca, "La supranacionalidad y la geometría variabile en el proceso de la integración centroamericana", Boletin Electrónico sobre Integración Regional del CIPEI (2011) 60. 10 For the purpose of this investigation the European Union and the other regional organizations established in the European Continent (i.e. Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE, etc.) will not be under consideration because they are already well-known and over-analyzed. However some references to the EU experience will be inevitable particularly when dealing with the application of the variable geometry in supranational organizations. organic) act. In such a way this state will not be involved in the adoption of this act which will not be prevented by the lack of its consent.
Secondly, particularly regarding conventional acts, the variable geometry may operate also in the implementation phase. In fact, consistently with the rules of international law, the entry into force of these acts may be subordinated to the deposit of a limited number of ratifications.
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In this case, formerly the member state has given its consent to the formation of the act, but it is free to choose if to give effect to it into its legal order or not.
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Clearly, its decision will not hamper the entry into force of the conventional act if the prescribed number of ratifications is achieved. It is worth noting that within a regional organization the variable geometry may operate through the joint application of these two procedures; in both of them the act does not produce legal effects towards the state which has not expressed its consent to the formation of the act or has not implemented it. Moreover it is worth noting that the application of the variable geometry does not prevent the unwilling state to adhere to this specific (conventional or organic) act later. Indeed, it can decide to bind itself to it in any time expressing its consent and implementing it, as duly provided. In sum, the variable geometry approach guarantees a flexible participation in the organization, allowing member states to agree on further progress of their cooperation and preventing that the lack of agreement and wholeness among all members on a specific issue leads to a deadlock of the organization.
THE VARIABLE GEOMETRY AND THE SOFT ORGANIZATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
As already said, in the area of developing countries the phenomenon of international organization often assumes the features of soft organization which has its founding act in one or more non-binding political-diplomatic declarations but shares with hard organization the objective and steady exercise of common international functions. The model of soft organization has acquired particular importance in Asia and in the area of formerly Socialist countries where it often represents the prodromic phase of interstate cooperation then evolving into institutionalized organizations by signing an international agreement.
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Moreover it has also had a certain wide appeal in Latin America, 14 while it is rare in 11 Generally, the required number of ratifications for the entry into force of a conventional act is expressly indicated in its final provisions.
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A member state's failure in the incorporation of an act in relation to which it has expressed its consent may have a political or judicial consequence pursuant to treaty provisions.
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Apart from the ASEAN, the model of soft organization operated also in the Shanghai Forum (then SCO), GUUAM (then GUAM-ODED), BSEC (then OBSEC), before their cooperation was institutionalized by signing a statutory treaty. In this sense see also the experiences of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and of the SARC which were then institutionalized respectively in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and in the SAARC. See P. Pennetta, Il regionalismo multipolar asiático. Contributo al diritto della operazione istituzionalizzata fra Stati (Giappichelli, Torino, 2003) , at 48 and at 52. Africa and in the Arab-Islamic world.
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In this complex overview, consistently with the members' purpose and with the goals of their cooperation as well as with the legal nature of this cooperation model, some soft organizations (such as ACD, APEC, IORA, Conseil de l'Entente, Foro del Arco del Pacífico, CELAC) pursue statutory objectives adopting mainly non-binding agreed acts (such as recommendations, declarations, action plans, etc.). As already said, the inner flexibility of such acts, deriving from their non-binding nature, makes it less relevant the provision and application of variable geometry; so these forms of association will not be taken into account in this investigation. 16 Unlike, in some other soft organizations interstate cooperation is achieved not only through declarations or recommendations, but also through the adoption of conventional acts, regulating both institutional and substantive matters. This is the case of ASEAN, SCO, It is worth noting that even if in these organizations the variable geometry approach has never been applied until now to binding acts, in some of them it is provided for by their statutory acts. In this sense, see art. 30 of the Declaración de Caracas; art.2 of the IORA Charter. The voluntary nature of the cooperation process was also asserted by 1995 Osaka Action Agenda regarding the APEC and by the 1997 Joint Statement of the 1 st BIMST-EC Ministerial Meeting and BIMST-EC Guidelines. In the light of these statutory provisions, I presume that the opting-out approach could be broadly used also in these organizations when concluding conventional acts, even more so considering their wide membership which could make it difficult to reach the consent of all member states in relation to each matter to be regulated.
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Shanghai Forum (Shanghai, 1996) Freedom to accede to a treaty (or external protocol) concluded within an organization, is traditionally provided for in universal organizations; in this sense an example is the practice in the ILO.
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It is worth noting that no founding act of soft organizations under consideration contains provisions expressly excluding the application of variable geometry. So, potentially, this principle may have a broad and unconditional application.
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Indeed, before the institutionalization of the organization, the SCO member states adopted few agreements. See, Agreement on confidence-building measures the military sphere in the border areas (adopted 26 April 1996, entered into force 7 May 1998); Agreement on mutual reduction of armaments in the border area (adopted 24 April 1997, entered into force 6 August 1999); Shanghai Convention on combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (adopted 15 June 2001, entered into force 29 March 2003). They were concluded by all the members and their entry into force was subject to the organizations whose membership is wide (ASEAN, BSEC) as well as in those established by a limited number of states (BIMST-EC, GUAM), when adopting international agreements as normative tools for interstate cooperation, the variable geometry approach is almost the rule. So, whenever a conventional act is going to be adopted within these organizations, notwithstanding the matters covered by it, each member state is free to decide if to take part in the decision-making procedure and then to implement it or not. In this context the member state does not have to accomplish a specific procedure or to justify its decision, but it has just to express its disinterest in deepening cooperation in a determined field. So the variable geometry is not applied in last resort, only when a common and shared opinion about the act to be approved cannot be reached. On the contrary, it is usually applied systematically and regarding every field of cooperation. In particular, the experiences of BIMST-EC, See, for example, Agreement among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation participating states on cooperation in combating crime, in particular in its organized forms (adopted 2 October 1998, entered into force 4 October 1999).
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In the BIMST-EC flexibility was applied particularly in the field of infrastructural cooperation. In the American Continent even the OAS -see Charter of the Organization of the American States (adopted 30 April 1948, entered into force 13 December 1951) 119 UNTS 47-operates according to the intergovernmental model. It will not be analyzed in this paper as it gathers also developed countries, such as the USA. However in this context the variable geometry approach has a broad application. In the light of such considerations the issue of the variable geometry application does not concern these organizations, even if their statutory treaties often provide it. In this regard see art. 3 lit. c) of the Tratado Montevideo; art. 20 of the Convention ACS; art.18 of the Convenio Panamá; art.16 of the Traité UMA; art.5 of the CSTO Treaty. It is worth noting that, in application of variable geometry approach, the ALADI promotes the conclusion of acuerdos de alcance parcial as well as acuerdos de complementación económica among some member states.
Unlike in some other intergovernmental organizations in developing countries the typical normative instruments of interstate cooperation are not only agreed non-binding acts but also -and particularly-the conventional acts. 61 Thus, in order to achieve statutory goals, following the initiative of the institutional bodies of the organization, member states generally conclude international agreements which always require their express consent.
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Clearly the normative production of such organizations can be more or less copious according to their vitality 63 and, as already said, conventional acts may be adopted to: 1) regulate institutional aspects of interstate cooperation; 2) regulate substantive aspects of interstate cooperation; 3) establish new agencies or organisms endowed with sectorial competences, which are subsidiary and instrumental to the main organization.
Finally, in some (few) intergovernmental organizations under consideration -such as UNASUR, MERCOSUR, SICA/SIECA, COMESA, ECOWAS, EurAsEc, OECS -statutory objectives are reached not only through agreed non-binding acts and international agreements, but also through the adoption of organic acts by the institutions of the organization and imputable to it.
These may be both binding and non-binding (such as recommendations and declarations) and the variable geometry approach may operate in relation to both categories. However the application of such approach to non-binding organic acts is not particularly relevant in the light of their already inner flexibility; 64 so it will not be discussed further. On the contrary, the application of the variable geometry assumes a great relevance in relation to binding organic acts. So, as for the soft organizations considered above, regarding the intergovernmental organizations the application of variable geometry will be assessed taking into account only those forms of association which adopt binding (conventional and/or organic) acts concretely, firstly analyzing their statutory provisions and then looking for an acknowledgment in their practice.
A comparative analysis of their statutory treaties reveals that generally they are silent about the principle of variable geometry and they do not regulate its application. However, in some cases (UNASUR, CARICOM, SIECA, SADC, LAS, ASEAN, SCO, OBSEC) variable geometry has its -more or less explicit-legal basis in the founding agreement of the organization. Generally it is 61 Generally no specific instrument of action is established in the statute of regional organizations; in this case the use of the conventional act can be inferred by the practice. However, in some regional organizations the international treaty is explicitly indicated in the statute as the instrument of action.
Conventional acts are adopted to implement statutory rules and, in this sense, they realize the secondary law of the organization. However, from the formal point of view, being concluded, signed and ratified by member states they cannot be imputable to the organization and follow the rules of public international law. For these reasons they may be regarded as an intermediate category between the primary law (with whom they share the form) and the secondary law (with whom they share the purpose). In this sense see, S. Deluca, supra n. 6, at. 247.
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For example, in the IGAD, ECCAS, CSTO, UNASUR, OECS, PIF and PC the adoption of international agreements is not very copious. 64 The adoption of non-binding organic acts is expressly provided for in the ECOWAS and in the COMESA (art. 5 COMESA Treaty). Moreover they are often adopted within the SADC and the CARICOM. In the GCC harmonization of domestic legislation in specific fields is realized through non-binding organic acts and member states are free to accept them into their law systems. Then, after years, the content of such acts is often transposed in binding acts thus becoming compulsory for each member state. Regarding this practice, see P. Pennetta, Il regionalismo multipolare …, supra n. 12, at 160. However, even when it is provided for by statutory agreements, the application of variable geometry is never regulated in details or subordinated to specific procedures or limited ratione materiae. In this sense the OBSEC is an exception because its rules of procedure narrow down the use of the variable geometry approach to decisions on specific issues pertaining to technical matters and/or functioning of the organization; indeed art. 18 par. 3 points out that they are binding only for member states which have voted in favor. Unlike, resolutions on substantive issues pertaining to the structure and/or functioning of the OBSEC will be abided by all member states (art. 17 par. 3).
(1) The Variable Geometry in the Practice of Intergovernmental Organizations: the Conventional Acts
As said above, the comparative analysis of statutory treaties does not reveal a homogeneous trend about the regulation of the variable geometry approach in the intergovernmental organizations under consideration; however the study of their practice proves its broad application. Indeed, firstly the variable geometry approach operates in the adoption of conventional acts within those intergovernmental organizations whose statutory treaties authorize its application (UNASUR, CARICOM, SADC, LAS, ASEAN, SCO, OBSEC). Then, it is applied also to international agreements adopted within intergovernmental organizations whose founding treaties do not provide See also art. 52 of the Protocolo de Guatemala; art. 9 of the LAS Charter.
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It is worth noting that in that case the term "decision" is not used in a technical meaning, referring to each act adopted within the organization. In the Diskenson Bay Declaration (4 July 2008), CARICOM Heads of states reiterated their support for a variable geometry of integration "[…] which allow for variation in the pace of accession to the integration arrangements".
ODED the variable geometry approach is not applied when adopting international agreements; indeed their conventional acts require the adhesion of all member states.
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The analysis of the intergovernmental organizations' practice reveals also that the application of variable geometry is not affected by the size of the organization membership; indeed it operates in forms of association with wide membership as well as in those with few members. Moreover in most intergovernmental organizations under consideration the variable geometry is applied almost systematically, whenever a conventional act is adopted. Unlike, in some others (OECS, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, GCC) its application is not generalized and it operates only in relation to specific agreements depending on issues they regulate. Thus, sometimes in these organizations agreements are concluded by all member states and their entry into force requires the consent and ratification by all of them.
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Finally, the analysis of intergovernmental organizations' practice reveals that the opting-out system is not limited ratione materiae. Thus, firstly in almost all intergovernmental organizations under consideration it applies to international agreements regulating substantive matters. They may concern every field of cooperation; precisely, the variable geometry can operate in relation to any conventional act regulating not only new and ancillary policies, but also those which were formerly It is worth noting that SAARC Charter (art. 10) excludes expressly the application of variable geometry; differently a similar provisions is not contained in the GUAM/ODED statutory treaty, so it is presumable that in this organization the variable geometry could operate in the future, maybe in relation to thorny issues.
In the GCC, for example, variable geometry applied to the GCC Monetary Union Agreement (adopted 30 December 2008) which was concluded only by four out of the six GCC member States. Unlike, the Economic Agreement between the GCC states (adopted 31 December 2001) was concluded by all members and entered into force after being ratified by all of them.
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See, for example, Protocolo de cooperação e assistência jurisdictional em material civil, commercial, trabalhista e administrativas (adopted 27 June 1992, entered into force 17 March 1996); Protocolo de medidas cautelares (adopted 16 December 1994, entered into force 9 September 1998); Protocolo de San Luis en materia de responsabilidad civil emergente de accidente de tránsito entre los estados miembros del MERCOSUR (adopted 25 June 1996, entered into force 20 November 2001); Acordo de estradição entre os estados partes Mercosul (adopted 10 December 1998, entered into force 2 November 2006); Protocolo de defesa da concorrência do Mercosul (adopted 10 December 1998, not yet in force). For example, the variable geometry approach operates in the realization of the OECS economic union. In fact the Protocol on the Economic Union is annexed to the Revised Treaty of Basseterre, so its entry into force is linked to that of the Revised Treaty. Concretely the latter was signed by 6 out of 9 OECS member states and its entry into force is subordinated to the deposit of 4 instruments of ratification (art. 25). It is also worth noting that at the time of ratifying the Revised Treaty a state, which is party to the Treaty of Basseterre of 1981 may make reservation in respect of the Economic Union Protocol.
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The variable geometry approach is applied also to the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). For the agreements adopted within the CARICOM in application of such approach see http://www.caricomlaw.org/Legislation.aspx For a complete overview of international conventions on substantive matters adopted within the OIC, consult http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/page/?p_id=40&p_ref=16&lan=en. As already said, in intergovernmental organizations conventional acts can be adopted also to regulate institutional matters of interstate cooperation. Indeed, member states of these organizations often aim to strengthen their cooperation by adapting the institutional structure to political and legal needs arising over time. This determines the adoption of further protocols establishing new organssuch as parliamentary assemblies or consultative bodies dealing with economic and social matters, as well as courts of justice called upon to exercise the jurisdictional function within the organizationwhich are merely mentioned in the founding agreement or were not originally foreseen. The CACJ's opinion is absolutely questionable because it forgets that international agreements (as the Convenio del Estatuto de la Corte Centroamericana de Justicia) are res inter alios acta for those states which have not signed and ratified them, so they do not product legal effects to them. As a consequence those members are not bound by the normative acts or judgments of these new bodies. In this sense the application of variable geometry approach to institutional matters makes it really difficult to create a widely common and shared set of rules by all member states of the organization. in the African Continent-the variable geometry approach applies also to this kind of agreements so that the membership of these subsidiary agencies or organisms is partially different from that of the main organization.
(2) The Variable Geometry in the Practice of Intergovernmental Organizations: the Binding Organic Acts.
As already said, in some (few) intergovernmental organizations -such as MERCOSUR, SICA/SIECA, COMESA, ECOWAS, EURASEC, OECS -statutory objectives are achieved not only through international agreements concluded by member states, but also through binding secondary acts adopted by the institutions of the organization and imputable to it.
119
They can be provided for expressly by the founding agreement of the organization or be the outcome of a normative evolution; in any case, their adoption is almost limited.
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However, for the purpose of this research it is worth ascertaining the application of the variable geometry principle also in relation to such typology of acts. In reality, this is not easy at all even because information about intergovernmental organizations and their normative production is often incomplete or even inaccessible. So the following considerations will be based on available data and news which are not often helpful. In fact, statutory agreements of these intergovernmental organizations do not provide for or regulate the application of the variable geometry approach to binding organic acts. Charter establishing the Centre for coordination of agricultural research and development in South Africa (adopted 5 November 2010, entered into force 3 May 2011).
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Regarding the SICA in July 2013 the new Reglamento para la adopción de decisiones del SICA (adopted 24 June 2013) entered into force. Its art.9 provides for the adoption of reglamentos whose legal features are quite literally similar to those of EU regulations (art. 288 TFEU). A more or less analogous trend to imitate the EU model with reference to organic acts characterizes also the COMESA and the ECOWAS (see, respectively, art. 10 of the COMESA Treaty; art.9 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/06/06. 120 Indeed, no binding organic acts have been adopted until now by the institutions of OECS. they are generally conceived as normative instruments with general application, binding every member state 121 unless it is expressly provided for by the founding agreement that they address to specific addressees.
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In any case, unlike the example of conventional acts analyzed above, when an institution of the organization adopts a specific act, each member state is bound by it and is under the obligation to implement it into its domestic legal system. If it fails, it is in breach of the organization law and may be subject to political or judicial consequences according to treaty provisions. In the light of these considerations it seems that the variable geometry does not apply to organic binding acts. This is undoubtedly true for MERCOSUR whose statutory agreement subordinates the entry into force of organic acts to their approval by all member states according to the principle of vigencia simultanea (art. 40 of the Protocolo de OuroPreto).
Taking into account the available information, the above assumption seems to be confirmed also by the practice of the other regional organizations under consideration. In fact the analysis of the secondary law of ECOWAS, COMESA, EurAsEc, SICA/SIECA reveals that binding organic acts are usually signed by the organ entitled to their adoption and do not indicate if any member state has expressed its disinterest in taking part in the decision-making procedure. So, in the light of the available practice it could be presumed that these acts are addressed to and bind all the members.
However, as no founding agreement forbids the application of variable geometry to binding organic acts, it could happen that member states introduce in the statutory treaty provisions authorizing a group of members to use such acts in order to move forward their cooperation in a specific field -in the example of the EU enhanced cooperation. In this sense it seems to express art. 8 par. 9 a) of the OECS Revised Treaty stating that "where the OECS Authority is taking a decision in relation to the Economic Union Protocol, the reference to full Member States in the preceding paragraph shall refer only to those full Member States which are parties to the Economic Union Protocol".
Unlike the above said, art. 12 of the Tratado UNASUR provides expressly the application of variable geometry to conventional as well as to organic acts. However, as already said, the UNASUR normative production is still scanty and currently no binding organic acts have been adopted, so no further considerations about the application of variable geometry are possible.
THE APPLICATION OF VARIABLE GEOMETRY IN SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
As known, supranational organizations are characterized by legal dynamism which translates into states' intention to restrict the exercise of their sovereignty under certain (strictly defined) conditions 121 See arts. 9, 15 and 20 of the Protocolo Ouro Preto; arts. 6, 8 and 9 of the Tratado UNASUR; art. 10 par.2 of the COMESA Treaty; art.9 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/06/06; art.8 par.8 andart.9 par.8 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre; arts. 8-9 of the Reglamento para la adopción de decisiones del SICA; art.31 par.2 of the Reglamento de organización y funcionamiento de los Consejos SIECA; art.5 of the EurAsEc Treaty.
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In this sense, see art.10 par. 3-4 of the COMESA Treaty; art.9 par.6 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/06/06; art.10 of the Reglamentopara la adopción de decisiones del SICA; art.31 par.3 of the Reglamento de organización y funcionamiento de los Consejos SIECA. and with regard to specific competences. Generally the European Union is considered the regional organization that better realizes the main features of supranational organizations. Furthermore, even international agreements may be adopted to achieve statutory goals.
In the European integration process the adoption of international agreements between the EU member states is secondary and limited to the regulation of ancillary matters in respect to the organization's primary goals, whose competence was not specified by the statutory treaty. The current regulation of the CAn, which has been repeatedly amended, is expressed by Decisión n.563, Codificación del Acuerdo de integración subregional andino (adopted 25 June 2003). Art. 293 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (now repealed) provided that member states concluded international agreements to regulate: 1. the protection of persons and the enjoyment and protection of rights under the same conditions as those accorded by each State to its own nationals; 2. the abolition of double taxation within the Community; 3. the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, the retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or firms governed by the laws of different countries; 4. the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards. Pursuant to this article some Community conventions were adopted, such as the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (adopted 27 September 1968, entered into force 1 February 1973); EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (adopted 19 June 1980, entered into force 1 April 1991). Moreover, in some cases they are adopted also to establish specialized institutions or organisms which are instrumental to the main organization.
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In this context the application of variable geometry seems to be rare. Firstly, founding agreements of supranational organizations in developing countries -namely UEMOA, CEMAC and CAn-do not provide for or authorize the application of variable geometry in their own legal systems.
In this regard they are consistent with the early experience of the European Union, where unity and uniformity were its main characteristics. 134 Then, normative practice of supranational organizations under consideration confirms statutory provisions; indeed the member states of CAn, UEMOA and CEMAC have not applied until now the opting-out approach to international agreements adopted within the organization. In fact, external protocols and treaties concerning both institutional and substantive matters are usually concluded by all member states and enter into force after being ratified by all of them.
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Furthermore variable geometry does not seem to operate even in respect to binding organic acts.
In fact, first of all, it is not regulated by the founding treaties. Then, binding organic acts of CAn, 136 Regarding the UEMOA, see lastly Acate additionnel n. 04/2013/CCEG/UEMOA instituant la politique commune de l'UEMOA dans le domaine de la paix et de la securité (adopted 24 October 2013, entered into force 24 October 2013); Acte additionnel n. 06/2013/CCEG/UEMOA portant institution de la politique commune de développement culturel au sein de l'UEMOA (adopted 24 October 2013, entered into force 24 October 2013).
Regarding the CAn see Protocollo adicional al Acuerdo de Cartagena "Compromiso de la Comunidad andina por la democracia" (adopted 17 October 1998). As already said, in the EU the application of variable geometry to international agreements dates back to late '80s -30 years after its institution -and may be considered one of main consequences of successive enlargements that transformed the relatively small and homogenous Community into a wider and looser integration process. Increased political, economic and cultural diversity led to a kind of structural incapacity of the EU to conduct always coherent policies and to agree on further progress. In this context differentiation among a limited number of member states offers the possibility to break out this deadlock and, in this sense, it represents a key factor of the European experience able to explore new roads towards integration. However it is worth outlining that in the EU the opting-out approach was/is merely an occasional and temporary phenomenon and concerned/concerns new policies, which are ancillary in respect to the original primary statutory objectives. In this sense Case C-370/12, Pringle, [2012] ECR 756. 136 Within the CAn the legal regulation of binding organic acts is not particularly clear and is only partially influenced by the EU model (arts. 1-3 of the Tratado de creación del Tribunal de Justicia). Institutions may adopt decisions and resolutions which are both binding and directly applicable. For an overview of the copious CAn normative production, consult http://www.comunidadandina.org/Normativa.aspx. are generally addressed to and bind all member states, unless they indicate expressly specific addressees. Moreover these acts, usually signed by the organ entitled to their adoption, do not indicate any member state which has expressed its disinterest in taking part in the decision-making procedure In sum, normative production of supranational organizations under consideration binds all member states and if they fail in implementing it, they may be subject to an infringement action in accordance with their statutory provisions. This approach is absolutely consistent with the particular legal nature of the cooperation model that these organizations embody, reflecting the existence of a strong common political will of member states to move forward in their cooperation jointly.
139
In this perspective it is to be considered that statutory treaties of supranational organizations under consideration provide for the possibility to adopt binding organic acts by majority; this means that a member state is bound by an act even if it has expressed its negative vote.
140
Compared to what is said above, the EAC represents an exception because art. 7 lit. e) of the EAC Treaty expressly provides for the application of variable geometry, including it in the EAC operational principles which govern the practical achievement of statutory objectives. No limits or particular conditions are defined for its application which can cover every field of cooperation. So, in the light of treaty provision variable geometry can be applied whenever a group of states within the organization intends to go forward in their cooperation thus realizing wider integration schemes in various fields and at different levels; in this sense the variable geometry system may become a rule.
However the EAC's practice reveals a different scenario. Even if it is authorized by the statutory treaty, this principle has never been applied until now either to international agreements or binding organic acts.
141
This reveals the existence of a strong voluntas cooperandi among the five EAC member states which are ready to progress together in integration. However the provision of variable geometry among the founding principles of a supranational organization is questionable on the basis of its fundamental features. Indeed, as already said, generally supranational organizations are characterized by a strong political will of member states which translates into their intention to limit the exercise of 137 According to art. 43 of the Traité modifié UEMOA institutions may adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions whose legal regulation is very similar to that provided for by the EU Treaty. To consult (conventional and organic) acts adopted within the UEMOA, see http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Home.aspx.
138
According to art. 41 of the Traité revise CEMAC institutions may adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions whose legal regulation is very similar to that provided for by the EU Treaty. To consult the CEMAC normative production -both conventional and organic acts -see http://www.cemac.int/textes-officiels.
139
The current provision of enhanced cooperation in the EU is not in contradiction with the early consideration or is a weak point. On the contrary, its application, strictly regulated and subordinated to specific conditions, is justified by the successive enlargements which make it difficult to agree on further progress of European integration. So the instrument of enhanced cooperation hampers its deadlock allowing willing and able member states to explore new roads towards integration. About the enhanced cooperation, see among others, A. Cannone, Le cooperazioni rafforzate. Contributo allo studio dell'integrazione europea (Cacucci, Bari, 2005) .
140
Even if statutory treaties of CEMAC, UEMOA and CAn provide for the majority, in the practice binding organic acts are generally adopted by unanimity or consensus.
141
The EAC Treaty provides that statutory objectives are pursued through the adoption of protocols as well as of binding organic acts (such as regulations, directives and decisions) whose definition is unclear. For an overview of the EAC normative production, consult http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=303-documents-andpublications&catid=34-body-text-area&Itemid=1. their sovereignty in certain fields in favour of a body to achieve common objectives; evidently this does not combine very well with a principle which allows member states to choose -under no conditions -activities, programs, acts to be bound by. About this issue the EAC Court of Justice (hereinafter EACJ) rendered an advisory opinion.
142
In particular the EACJ was asked to decide if the principle of variable geometry was in harmony with the rule of consensus in the decision-making procedure and if it could be applied to guide the integration process. 143 The EACJ explained that "consensus [...] is purely and simply a decision-making mechanism in Summit, Council and in other executive organs of the Community, while variable geometry as used therein is a strategy for implementation". 144 So, based on this distinction between decision and implementation, the EACJ finds consistency between the principle of variable geometry and the rule of consensus, noting that they are different stages in a single process.
145
The reasoning of the EACJ is absolutely correct and sharable but incomplete because it forgets that variable geometry may operate not only in the implementation phase but also in the early phase of the decision-making procedure, when parties have to express their consent or their disinterest in the adoption of a specific act. In any case the principle geometry is consistent with any voting criteria in decision-making procedures, representing a legal remedy to unanimity, consensus or majority CONCLUDING REMARKS My analysis reveals the broad application of the variable geometry approach in regional and subregional organizations in developing countries. It is not surprising that it applies to conventional acts in organizations whose membership is wide. Indeed in such forms of association -where states of asymmetrical size and powers, with diverging economic and political interests co-exist-sometimes it is difficult to reach a fully shared opinion about the regulation of specific fields of cooperation. In this situation the application of variable geometry permits a group of member states to move forward, thus preventing the paralysis of the organization; in this sense, it can be considered a valid remedial tool for unanimity or majority and a key factor to prevent deadlock of the integration process and to allow some member states to explore new roads towards integration then feasible by all members.
However my investigation has shown that the application of variable geometry is not influenced by the subjective dimension of the organization; indeed it has revealed an almost systemic and unconditional application of variable geometry in most of regional organizations of developing countries independently from their membership. In these contexts the principle of variable geometry This advisory opinion originated from the lack of agreement among EAC member states during common market negotiations. This meant that the Council of Ministers and the Summit could delay the negotiation until consensus was created or they could agree to proceed in a manner that accommodated differences, thus applying the variable geometry approach.
144 EACJ Application n. 1/2008, supra n. 142, par. 30. 145 In such advisory opinion the EACJ also argued that the principle of variable geometry "has been internationally applied to deepen integration" (par. 31) and cited the EU as a model, recommending the EAC to study and possibly to emulate its examples of application of this principle. applies even in the early stage of interstate cooperation to any conventional act regulating substantive issues (even primary policies to the realization of statutory goal) or institutional ones or even establishing new agencies and organisms instrumental to the main organization. So even the original basic progress of interstate cooperation is dependent on the political willingness and/or economic ability of the slowest member states.
Far from being perceived as extrema ratio to be applied only when, on the one hand, an agreement on a specific issue cannot be reached by all members and, on the other hand, a progression of integration in that field is considered suitable, or even necessary, the variable geometry becomes a rule, applied whenever a member state thinks that a deepening of the cooperation in a specific field impairs its interests. In this sense it represents a weak point of the organization, reflecting member states' unwillingness and/or inability to agree upon a common regulation of specific fields to reach statutory objectives. Clearly, this attitude expresses the existence of weak political will among member states which are not animated by a strong and long-term voluntas cooperandi. All this explains also why, in the light of my investigation, the opting-out approach represents an element of relevant qualification of soft organizations as well as of intergovernmental organizations, particularly when they choose the international agreement as main normative instrument for interstate cooperation. In any event the variable geometry approach is absolutely consistent with the legal nature of such cooperation models, because it guarantees a flexible participation in the organization for the member states which are sure that their interests and sovereignty are respected.
Unlike in supranational organizations, where members are ready to limit the exercise of their sovereignty in favour of the organization to reach fully shared goals, thus proving a strong voluntas cooperandi, variable geometry usually does not operate or, as in the case of the European Union, its application -introduced after 30-years integration-is merely occasional and temporary, subjected to strict conditions and limited to the regulation of new policies and ancillary matters in respect to the original primary goals. And even in the perspective of a strong political and association will it is to be regarded the provision of majority rule in the adoption of secondary law, according to which even the state expressing its negative vote is bound by the adopted act.
It is evident that the generalized application of variable geometry -in relation to substantive as well as institutional matters-and the lack of its strict regulation in most soft and intergovernmental forms of association can lead to the fragmentation of the law of the organization. Precisely, the freedom of the member states to be parties to conventional institutional and/or substantive acts implies that the legal framework of the organization, common to all member states, is reduced to the original founding treaty and the eventual protocols (to be defined case by case) in effect for all the member states. In this sense, the systemic, generalized and unconditional application of variable geometry does little to foster the coherence of the organization's legal order 146 and seems to call the concept of international organization into question. Indeed it breaks up founding elements of 146 In this sense, H. Schermers and N. Blokker, supra n. 1, at 1268 who explain that "A legislative process in which each act is based on a former legislation cannot be introduced when acts of the organization do not bind all members".
